Adopción y acceso a los orígenes ¿Qué puede aprender Ecuador de las experiencias de España y Argentina?
| Páginas | 208-220 |
| Fecha | 01 Julio 2026 |
| Fecha de publicación | 01 Julio 2026 |
| Autor | David Castillo Aguirre |
| Materia | Derecho Constitucional |
E N S A Y O
CÁLAMO
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ADOPTION AND ACCESS TO ORIGINS
What can Ecuador Learn from the Spanish and Argentinian Experiences?
ADOPCIÓN Y ACCESO A LOS ORÍGENES
¿Qué puede aprender Ecuador de las experiencias de España y Argentina?
ADOÇÃO E ACESSO ÀS ORIGENS
O que o Equador pode aprender com as experiências da Espanha e da Argentina?
David Castillo Aguirre, Universidad Hemisferios, Ecuador
Contacto: davidc@uhemisferios.edu.ec. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1219-7934
Abstract
Ecuadorian legislation regulates the right of adopted persons to access information about their origins in the
Organic Code of Children and Adolescents. However, this regulation does not fully develop the content of the
right, as other legal systems do. is article explores the Argentinian and Spanish regulations through the analy-
sis-synthesis method, to obtain inputs that may serve as a basis for a proposal for Ecuador. e results of this ex-
ploration lead us to highlight that Ecuador’s provision fails to observe parental duties and responsibilities, while
reinforcing an unequal relationship between adults and children, as it creates a disproportionate protection in
favor of biological parents at the expense of the adoptee’s identity. e article concludes by questioning: if the
legal systems that have thoroughly developed the content of the right to access one’s origins still present certain
problems and contradictions, to what extent is this right protected in the Ecuadorian legal system?
Keywords: Identity, Children’s rights, Family, Parentage, Parental responsibility, State obligations
Fecha de recepción: 9 de marzo, 2026 • Fecha de aceptación: 10 de mayo, 2026
Cómo citar: Castillo Aguirre, David. 2026. “Adoption and Access to Origins. What can Ecuador Learn from the Spanish
and Argentinian Experiences?”. Revista de Estudios Jurídicos Cálamo, núm. 25: 208-220.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.61243/calamo.25.492
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Resumen
La normativa ecuatoriana regula el derecho al acceso a los orígenes de las personas adoptadas en el Código
Orgánico de la Niñez y Adolescencia. Sin embargo, esta norma no desarrolla el contenido del derecho como lo
hacen otras legislaciones. A través del método análisis-síntesis, este artículo explora la regulación argentina y la
española con el n de obtener insumos como base de una propuesta para Ecuador. Los resultados de esta explo-
ración nos conducen a destacar que la norma ecuatoriana inobserva los deberes y responsabilidades parentales,
a la vez que fortalece una relación desigual entre adultos y niños, pues genera una protección desproporcionada
en favor de los padres biológicos, sacricando la identidad del adoptado. Por último, se concluye y cuestiona:
si en los ordenamientos jurídicos que han desarrollado el contenido del derecho al acceso a los orígenes del
adoptado todavía presentan ciertos problemas y contradicciones, ¿en qué medida estaría tutelado este derecho
en el ordenamiento jurídico ecuatoriano?
Palabras clave: Identidad, Derechos del niño, Familia, Filiación, Responsabilidad parental, Deberes estatales
Resumo
A legislação equatoriana regulamenta o direito de pessoas adotadas de acessarem suas origens no Código Orgâ-
nico da Criança e do Adolescente. Contudo, essa legislação não desenvolve o conteúdo desse direito tão plena-
mente quanto outros sistemas jurídicos. Por meio de um método de análise-síntese, este artigo explora as legis-
lações argentina e espanhola para obter subsídios para uma proposta de solução para o Equador. Os resultados
dessa exploração nos levam a destacar que a legislação equatoriana desconsidera os deveres e responsabilidades
parentais, ao mesmo tempo que reforça uma relação desigual entre adultos e crianças. Isso ocorre porque gera
proteção desproporcional aos pais biológicos, sacricando a identidade da pessoa adotada. Por m, o artigo
conclui e questiona o seguinte: se os sistemas jurídicos que desenvolveram o conteúdo do direito de pessoas
adotadas de acessarem suas origens ainda apresentam certos problemas e contradições, em que medida esse
direito é protegido no sistema jurídico equatoriano?
Palavras-chave: Identidade, Direitos da criança, Família, Filiação, Responsabilidade parental, Deveres do Estado
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY1
In Ecuadorian legislation, the adoptee’s right to identity appears as a principle of adoption: adopted persons
have the right to know their status as such, their origin, their personal history, and their consanguineous family,
except where there exists express prohibition by the latter (CONA, art. 153.6). is rule raises two problems:
(i) it does not make clear how this right should be exercised, and (ii) has permitted the consanguineous family
to prohibit the adopted child from knowing them. Despite the article is oriented toward protecting this right,
Ecuadorian law has not disaggregated the right to know one’s origins as it has occurred in other jurisdictions.
Neither the state duties nor the actions to which the adoptee who wishes to access their origins is entitled have
been delimited, nor have the content of the right and the information necessary to guarantee it been establi-
shed. is renders it more akin to a statement of intent rather than a legal obligation per se.
is article results from theoretical research developed through doctrinal sources and legal literature. e pur-
pose is to construct, based on logical reasoning, the core of a proposed regulation of the adoptee’s right to
access their origins in Ecuador (Villabella Armengol 2012, 926). e method employed is analysis-synthesis:
we decompose the right under study, as contained in two foreign legislations, to subsequently “recompose it
through the integration of its elements and highlight the system of relationships existing between the parts
and the whole”2 (Villabella Armengol 2012, 937). e two foreign legal systems selected are those of Argentina
and Spain. e former was chosen because, due to its political context, Argentine law has been a pioneer in the
development of the right to identity. e latter was chosen because, as we will see later, the Spanish legal system
contains advanced and cutting-edge legislation on the right to access one’s origins. is does not mean, in any
way, that this right has not been developed in other legal systems. However, the author of these remarks has had
the opportunity to research both legal systems in each country personally. is has enriched the research and
the proposal for the Ecuadorian legal system.
THE RIGHT TO KNOW ONE’S ORIGINS
In this section, we examine the two selected jurisdictions in which this right, also referred to as the right to
avoid origin deprivation (Diver 2015, 77), has been developed more extensively than in Ecuador: Spain and
Argentina.
Spain
In Spain, the right to know one’s origins was introduced in 2007 and reinforced in 2015. e judicial decree of
adoption is registered in the Civil Registry in the margin of the child’s birth registration. Given that this could
aect family privacy, a new registration is permitted in which only the birth data and information concerning
the person born, the personal circumstances of the adoptive parents, and the pertinent reference to their ma-
rriage appear, along with reference to the registry data of the previous registration (book, folio, page), which
1 is paper is part of the dissertation that the author is completing within the Doctorate in Law at Universidad Austral
(Buenos Aires, Argentina).
2 is translation and all subsequent translations from Spanish into English are the author’s own.
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is formally canceled. Any person may access the new registry, “whereas access to the prior cancelled entry is
restricted to the adoptee” (Mayor del Hoyo 2019, 357).
is means that, before 2007, the law allowed the adoptee to approach the Civil Registry searching for infor-
mation about their origins; however, it could occur that the person would not nd information regarding the
identity of their biological parents for various reasons.3 It was common for the administration to deny access to
the information, such that it was the judges, on a case-by-case basis, who ordered the administration to provide
the data (Barber Cárcamo 2017, 751). Spanish case law had to rule on several occasions in favor of the right to
access adoption les for persons to whom the administration had denied it.4 Gómez Bengoechea notes that sev-
eral arguments were employed in judicial decisions; we highlight the following: (i) data being claimed cannot
be considered solely as components of the parents’ personality rights, but rather as common to the relationship
between parents and children. erefore, they form part of the children’s personality rights. us, access would
be denied not to a third party, but to the rightful holder themselves; (ii) if the identication and liation of the
adoptee’s origin form part of the privacy, the active subject of condentiality is the adoptee themselves, such
that this sphere could not exclude them (Gómez Bengoechea 2007, 147).
In Law 54/2007 (on international adoptions), the Spanish legislature opted to recognize the right of adopted
persons to know data concerning their origins held by Spanish public entities. is right, as Mayor del Hoyo
explains, must be made eective with assistance from the public entity, which, in turn, is obligated to preserve
the information; while collaborating entities are obligated to provide the data at their disposal. Although this
law included the same provision in the Civil Code (so that it would also apply to domestic adoptions), the state
obligations set forth in Article 12 of the International Adoption Law were not incorporated. is omission re-
sulted in the exercise of the right culminating unsuccessfully. For this reason, through Law 26/2015, Article 180
of the Civil Code was amended to include the right of adopted people to access their origins under the same
terms as Law 54/2007 (Mayor del Hoyo 2019, 360). 5 us, paragraphs 5 and 6 provide:
Public Entities shall ensure the preservation of information at their disposal relating to the minor’s ori-
gins, in particular information regarding the identity of their progenitors, as well as the medical history
of the minor and their family, and it shall be preserved for at least y years following the time when
the adoption has become nal. e preservation shall be carried out for the sole purpose of enabling the
adopted person to exercise the right referred to in the following paragraph.
Adopted people, upon reaching the age of majority or during their minority through their legal repre-
sentatives, shall have the right to know data concerning their biological origins. Public Entities, following
3 e Supreme Court judgment of September 21, 1999, repealed Article 47.1 of the Civil Registry Act, which permitted
the mother to disclaim her maternity (anonymous childbirth).
4 E.g., STSJ of the Basque Country, No. 615/2003, of October 31 (JUR 2004(42405); STSJ of the Basque Country, No.
68/2002, of January 21 (JUR 2002/218074); STSJ of the Basque Country, No. 82/2000, of February 2 (JUR 2001/297843);
STSJ of the Basque Country, No. 407/2000, of July 14, 2000 (RJCA 2000, 2669); AAP of Barcelona, of February 22, 1996
(AC 1996/232).
5 In Catalonia, the adoptee may, additionally, request the biogenetic data of their progenitors in the interest of their
health.
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notication to the aected persons, shall provide through their specialized services the counseling and
assistance required to make this right eective. For these purposes, any private or public entity shall be
obligated to provide to the Public Entities and the Public Prosecutor’s Oce, when requested, with the
necessary reports and records concerning the minor and their family of origin.
e rst point to emphasize is the quality of information. e article states that adopted people have the
right to know data concerning their biological origins. Although one might think this does not include
knowing the identity of the progenitors, Mayor del Hoyo arms that “there is no doubt” that the adoptee
has the right to access the identity of the biological parents. is assertion is grounded in the text of the
h paragraph, which refers to “the information at their disposal” relating to the minor’s origins regar-
ding the identity of their progenitors (Mayor del Hoyo 2019, 362). e second aspect meriting analysis is
the reference to “the medical history (of the minor) and of their family.” Mayor del Hoyo maintains that
when the law speaks of family, it includes siblings, grandparents, etc. Although we believe the provision
would be limited to information concerning the progenitors, we consider that the wording creates confu-
sion. If the law refers to non-progenitor relatives, we will concur with the criticism, as medical informa-
tion of other relatives should not be accessible to the adoptee.
Mayor del Hoyo assesses this provision as excessive. She believes it penalizes the progenitor and the family,
depriving them of enjoying their right to privacy. We disagree, as we consider that the position against access to
the progenitors’ medical history fails to consider an essential element: the reason motivating the adoptee’s need
to access this information. If the adoptee wishes to know the medical history of their progenitors, it is because
they have a legitimate interest in diseases that could be hereditary and, therefore, aect them. is information
(the progenitors’ medical history) is a secret that Riofrío would classify as “relative”; that is, one to which certain
persons may legitimately have access under specic circumstances (Riofrío 2015, 148).
We ask ourselves, how is compliance with this disclosure obligation guaranteed? We do not believe that
the provision of Spanish law is oriented toward the adoptee having the right, at any moment in their life,
to request the medical history of their biological parents. is would entail contravening the protection
of their personal data and privacy. We incline toward the idea that the state has a duty to collect medical
information from t he progenitors (though typic ally this pertains to the mother) within th e adoption le and
that, from that m oment forward, the adoptee is entitled to access thi s information. If the le’s contents prove
insucient for the adoptee, they would have the right to contact their mother to inquire about what they
deem necessary. e mother, in turn, wou ld have the right to update t he information she considers relevant
and to refuse to respond if consulted.
is constitutes, then, a legal duty to inform that must be pursued through the counseling of the public o-
cial preparing the adoption le. We believe that, if the information is sucient, it is possible that the adoptee
may not even have the need to contact their biological parents. Perhaps that is the most signicant eect of
the reformed Article 180 of the Spanish Civil Code: inuencing the ocial’s conduct to endeavor to compile
the highest amount of information within the le, notwithstanding that the adoptee may opt to contact their
biological family. A question arises: could the adoptee’s children request access to the clinical history or data
concerning their grandparents’ origins? e Spanish Code makes no reference to adoptees’ descendants, despi-
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te the existing possibility of medical reasons. Nowadays, this idea would be far from feasible in the Ecuadorian
legal context, given that the right to access one’s origins has not yet been properly regulated. Additionally, we
must address the temporal limitation established by the Spanish article under analysis. Fiy years are establi-
shed from the adoption for the adoptee to exercise their right to know data concerning their biological origins.
Although we consider the Spanish timeframe quite broad, we do not deem it appropriate to establish a time
limit for the exercise of this right. If human rights are imprescriptible (Nikken 2010, 70), the adoptee’s human
right to identity should not be forfeited with the passage of time.
Regarding the state obligation, we note that the public entity’s duties are not limited to preserving the data and
delivering them to the adoptee upon request. Moreover, should it not possess the information, it must request
it from other entities that are, in turn, obligated to provide it. Of course, criticisms exist regarding the scope of
adopted persons’ right to access their origins in Spain. Mayor del Hoyo maintains that the legislature has rende-
red this right absolute without it being expressly recognized in the Constitution. is, she adds, would generate
contradictions or inconsistencies with the regulation on assisted reproductive techniques (Mayor del Hoyo
2019, 370).6 Spanish legislation, Mayor del Hoyo continues, does not balance or reconcile the right to access
one’s origins with the mother’s right to remain anonymous. e author agrees with Vidal Prado, who advocates
for a “dose of realism” that recognizes the adoptee’s right could deter potential adoptive parents and jeopardize
the institution of adoption (Vidal Prado 1996, 268). Accordingly, reconsideration of this right’s regulation is
proposed to unify criteria and reconcile them with women’s rights (Mayor del Hoyo 2019, 374).
Gómez Bengoechea concurs that inconsistency would exist in Spanish legislation. However, she maintains that
the Spanish legal system does not contemplate the possibility of investigating one’s own origin as a fundamental
right. is is due to the relation between known information concerning biological origin and the rights to
physical and moral integrity and to free development of personality (Gómez Bengoechea 2007, 295).
Argentina
Argentina has developed the content of the adoptee’s right to know their origins within Article 596 of the Civil
and Commercial Code (CCC, art. 596).
(i) e adoptee with sucient age and degree of maturity has the right to know data related to their origin
and may access, when required, the judicial and administrative le in which their adoption was processed
and other information contained in judicial or administrative records; (ii) If the person is a minor, the
judge may order the intervention of the court’s technical team, the protection agency, or the adoptive
parents registry to provide collaboration. e adoptive family may request counseling from the same
bodies; (iii) e judicial and administrative le must contain the greatest possible amount of data regar-
ding the child’s identity and their family of origin relating to that origin, including those pertaining to
transmissible diseases; (iv) e adoptive parents must expressly commit to making the adoptee’s origins
known to them, with a record of that declaration remaining in the le; and (v) in addition to the right to
6 Mayor del Hoyo adds that not even a person whose liation by nature does not derive from these techniques has a guar-
anteed right to know their paternal biological origin: neither the identity nor the medical history of the father, insofar
as while the law mandates the determination of maternity, it does not mandate the determination of paternity.
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access the les, the adolescent adoptee is entitled to initiate an autonomous action with the purpose of
knowing their origins. In this case, they must have legal assistance.7
e article refers to origins without using the term “biological”. is implies that it allows access to all informa-
tion concerning the adoptee’s past and “refers to life outside the biological family, such as that developed in fos-
ter care or institutions” (De Lorenzi et al. 2019, 10). e provision seeks to ensure that origins are not reduced
to genetic information or place of birth. It goes further to include personal history and consanguineous family.
e purpose of this provision is to broaden the conception of origin, since identity is constructed through bio-
graphy, and no biography is exhausted by a datum of origin.
e second element is that the provision enshrines the right “to know” without referring to contact. De Lorenzi
explains that this occurs because the law is not empowered to create aective bonds between people, nor to
compel them to maintain a relationship against their wishes. is does not imply that adoptive parents have the
right to conceal or obstruct the child’s access to their origins. e provision requires the parents to expressly
undertake to ensure that the adoptee can know their origins. is constitutes a legal duty deriving from parental
responsibility. We consider that, while the provision of the Argentine Code tends to favor the adoptee’s rights,
its protection of the family of origin is rather excessive. We disagree with De Lorenzi when she mentions that
the law is not empowered to generate aective bonds, for, although we know that the law does not have such
eects, we believe this position (i) assumes that the adoptee wishes to create such bonds and (ii) considers that
such bonds could, in some manner, harm the biological parents.
Regarding the rst point, it is commonly thought that the adoptee wishes to contact their consanguineous fa-
mily for the purpose of reestablishing aective bonds; this view limits the right to identity, since contact would
not imply bonds that both parties do not desire. Normative prohibition assumes that, in all cases, the adoptee
wishes to make contact to bond eectively, when they merely seek to know themselves. Concerning the second
point, the idea that contact between the adoptee and their family of origin could harm the latter is based on the
notion that, when biological parents place their child for adoption, they wish to leave their past behind. is
position prioritizes, once again, the rights of the family of origin over the adoptee’s right to identity. We consi-
der that this argument should be advanced only in cases where the child is the result of sexual assault and the
mother does not wish to maintain a relationship with the child, given that compelling such a relationship may
constitute a form of revictimization. In any event, we do not believe the prohibition should be absolute, as the
mother could change her mind throughout her life.
WHAT CAN ECUADORIAN LEGISLATION LEARN: FOUNDATIONS FOR A PROPOSAL
Ecuadorian law could develop the content of the right to access one’s origins more extensively. First, the adoptee
should access their le when required. is constitutes broad standing that does not require a minimum age but
rather proof of sucient age and maturity. According to Quiñoa, those who support this expansion maintain
that the child’s maturity must be evaluated, on a case-by-case basis, by the judge. On the other hand, those who
criticize it believe that the child could be harmed when confronted with a biography that is dicult to process
(Quiñoa 2023, 310). Given the signicance of the information requested and the vulnerability of the adopted
7 Author’s translation.
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child, the intervention of a specialized technical team should be mandatory and not optional, as the CCC esta-
blishes (Quiñoa 2023, 311). We assess this expansion of standing as favorable, since the adopted child does not
begin to question their origins from age eighteen onward.
e second point to emphasize is the obligation of administrative and judicial authorities to record in the le
the highest possible amount of information. We note that an exhaustive list of requirements is not demanded, as
there is no intention to delimit the information contained in the le; the more information, the better. We assess
this provision as positive because it could be, in numerous instances, the only source for the adoptee to know
part of their biography. e provision would bind not only judicial authorities but also administrative ones.
Information about the child’s pre-adoptive stage is vital so that, if desired, the adoptee can know their history
(Quiñoa 2023, 313). For this reason, we believe that Ecuadorian law would do well to incorporate the provision
if it wishes to better guarantee the right to access one’s origins.
e third element is the adoptive parents’ commitment to ensuring that the child is informed about their
origins. Access to origins includes knowledge of the adopted person’s history, not only regarding their consan-
guineous family, but also in foster care institutions that form part of their personal history (De Lorenzi et al.
2019, 10). e provision would obligate adoptive parents to expressly commit to making the adoptee’s origins
known to them. at declaration would be registered in the adoption le. A question arises: is it a moral or a
legal duty? Authors who consider it a moral duty criticize that it constitutes a mere commitment and that the
law should have avoided ambiguities and contemplated a sanction for non-compliance to ensure that the adop-
tee can access their origins (Quiñoa 2023, 314). Others consider it reasonable that no sanction exists because it
would signify a vote of no condence toward adoptive parents (González de Vicel 2015, 99-ss). We agree with
those who lean toward the proposition that it is correct for the provision not to include sanctions for failure to
comply with the commitment. Administrative and judicial authorities must evaluate the suitability of prospec-
tive adoptive parents, and this includes understanding the commitment. If the commitment is breached, the
adoptee would be entitled to bring an action against their parents for the caused harm.
We believe that the Ecuadorian legal framework would be receptive to recognizing the adoptee’s access to their
origins. e Constitution recognizes the child’s right to family life in Article 45. is right is linked to identity and
does not discriminate against adopted children. In fact, adoption is part of the normative system because it is a
protection mechanism that seeks to guarantee the child’s right to a family and to enjoy family life. e right to have
a family does not have to imply denial of the right to identity. is idea is reinforced by Article 69 of the Consti-
tution, which establishes that, to protect the rights of family members, “[d]aughters and sons shall have the same
rights without regard to background of liation or adoption” (Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador, article 69).
CONCLUSIONS
e right to access one’s origins appears to be protected by Ecuadorian law as part of the adoptee’s human right
to identity.8 However, its recognition is insucient. Legislature (i) has not made clear how this right should
8 Since the enactment of the CRC, Ecuadorian constitutional provisions have sought to protect children’s rights. See:
Simon Campaña, Farith. 2023. “Ecuador”. In La constitucionalización de los derechos de las niñas, niños y adolescentes
en América Latina, Nicolás Espejo Yaksic and Lovera Parmo (eds.), 169-204. Mexico: Tirant Lo Blanch. And: Simon
Campaña, Farith. 2021. Manual de Derecho de Familia. Quito: Cevallos.
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be exercised, and (ii) it has permitted the consanguineous family to prohibit the adopted child from knowing
them. We consider that the prohibition disregards parental duties and responsibilities while simultaneously
reinforcing an unequal relationship between adults and children, as it generates disproportionate protection
in favor of biological parents. Access to origins should include the possibility of knowing and contacting the
consanguineous family. Given that the prohibition is contained in a normative instrument of inferior rank and
contradictory to the Constitution, in our view, it would be unconstitutional.
Despite the favorable constitutional framework, this right is not properly safeguarded. We believe that, viewed
with optimism, this represents an opportunity for our proposal to benet from the experience of foreign legis-
lation. is is urgent because if an adopted person does not know their origins, harm, and liabilities are gene-
rated. is constitutes another form of abandonment of children who, we must remember, have already been
victims of neglect (Berástegui Pedro-Viejo & Gómez Bengoechea 2008, Martínez 2018). As they grow, children
integrate more complex understandings of their identity and their sense of belonging to their biological, social,
and cultural family and groups (Bennett Woodhouse 1995, 112). In early adolescence, the person’s need to
know about their origins increases; the adoptee begins to worry about hereditary characteristics or diseases,
and they might even fear committing incest. Because it is normally expected that parents will take the initiative
in this delicate area, it would be a mistake to assume that the child who does not ask is not curious. Unanswered
questions contribute to the development of identity problems.
Secrecy concerning origins has been rejected, both in theory and within legal norms, as it proves insucient
to conceal the truth, as well as harmful to the relations among the subjects comprising the adoption triad (De
Lorenzi et al. 2019, 17). Several authors concur on the advantages of informing the adoptee of the truth as soon
as possible, as this allows for demonstrating availability for open, honest, and ongoing communication, as well
as empathy, understanding, and respect towards their needs (Siegel 2012, Amorós 1987, Berástegui Pedro-Vie-
jo & Gómez Bengoechea 2008, Giberti 1981). ere is evidence that, for adult adoptees, access to information
about their biological origins can be fundamental in the construction of their identity. While there may be little
dierence in the comprehensive sense of identity between adoptees and non-adoptees, adoptees believe that
their belonging to two families plays an important role in how they think about themselves (Cahn & Singer
1999, Burke 1975, Bustamante 2014). us, concealment of origins can prove harmful to the adopted person
and provoke an identity crisis. Honesty helps in accepting the dual identity of adoptees and the fundamental
character that the biological component has for their formation and strengthening (Pannor & Baran 1984).
e right to access one’s origins cannot merely remain as a principle of adoption; its development becomes in-
creasingly necessary. is article has focused on identifying other legal systems (Spanish and Argentinian) from
which Ecuadorian law can benet in developing the content of the right to identity and access to the origins of
adopted persons. Of course, the proposal that will follow as the next step in this research, based on the work we
have previously carried out, will be grounded not only in the constitutional and conventional basis of this right,
but also in a constructive critique of Ecuadorian laws and institutions related to it.
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