Buena fe e información objetiva precontractual
| Autor | Valeria De Lorenzi |
| Cargo | Università degli Studi di Torino, full-tenured professor of Private Law at the Department of Law where she teaches Private Law and Civil Law |
| Páginas | 139-177 |
Lorenzi, V. Pre-contractual objective good faith and information
139
Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia Especial 75 Aniversario PUCE
Pre-contractual objective Good Faith and
information. Duties of information
Buena Fe e información objetiva precontractual.
Deberes de información
Valeria De Lorenzi
Università degli Studi di Torino
City: Turin
Country: Italy
Original article (research)
RFJ, No. 9 Especial 75 años PUCE, pp. 139 -177, ISSN: 2588-0837
ABSTRACT: In the preliminary phase of contracting, the
fundamental importance of information, and the information
exchanged by the pre-contractual parties, is undoubted. Parties,
by entering a contract, seek to pursue their interest, to maximise
their welfare. Based on the information it possesses, a party
decides to conclude or not to conclude the contract; if the party
concludes the contract, the pre-contractual information spills
over into the content of the contract, influencing the contractual
agreements, the reciprocal performances established, the
conditions under which the contract is concluded. This is not
a work of economic analysis, but rather a legal work; economic
analysis is used exclusively to highlight problems, to which the
rules of the Civil Code provide a solution. The pre-contractual
problems in the light of economic analysis, arising from the
asymmetries of information between the parties at the time
of the conclusion of the contract, and the solutions to them
provided by the rules of the civil code, have already been
examined by the writer in a fragmentary way during studies
concerning representation and the insurance contract. The
survey will briefly examine information, and especially pre-
contractual information, and the problems connected with it, in
the light of economic analysis; it will then focus on the rules of
the Civil Code that deal with pre-contractual information and the
problems connected with it and will try to find solutions to them.
DOI 10.26807/rfj.v2i9.429
Lorenzi, V. Pre-contractual objective good faith and information
140
Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia Especial 75 Aniversario PUCE
KEYWORDS: contracts, information, legal systems, civil law,
civil liability.
RESUMEN: En la fase previa a la contratación, no cabe duda de la
importancia fundamental de la información, y de la información
que intercambian las partes precontratantes. Las partes, al
celebrar un contrato, buscan su propio interés, maximizar su
propio bienestar. Sobre la base de la información que posee,
una parte decide celebrar o no el contrato; si la parte celebra el
contrato, la información precontractual se traslada al contenido
del contrato, influyendo en los acuerdos contractuales, en las
prestaciones recíprocas establecidas, en las condiciones en
que se celebra el contrato. No se trata de una obra de análisis
económico, sino de una obra jurídica; el análisis económico se
utiliza exclusivamente para poner de manifiesto los problemas, a
los que las normas del Código Civil dan solución. Los problemas
precontractuales a la luz del análisis económico, derivados de
las asimetrías de información entre las partes en el momento
de la celebración del contrato, y las soluciones a los mismos que
aportan las normas del código civil, ya han sido examinados
por el autor de forma fragmentaria en el curso de los estudios
relativos a la representación y al contrato de seguro. El estudio
examinará brevemente la información, y especialmente la
información precontractual, y los problemas relacionados con
ella, a la luz del análisis económico; a continuación, se centrará
en las normas del código civil que tratan de la información
precontractual y los problemas relacionados con ella, intentando
aportar soluciones a los mismos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: justicia, reforma legal, norma legal,
constitución, sistema político.
JEL CODE: K12, D8.
Lorenzi, V. Pre-contractual objective good faith and information
141
Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia Especial 75 Aniversario PUCE
INTRODUCTION
Various types of information1 are present, including
technological information, information on production resources
and opportunities, and market information.
In connection with the negotiation, market information
on circumstances, characteristics, elements, terms, assumptions
concerning the contract to be concluded (e.g., on market
circumstances, on the expediency of the deal, on contractual
terms, on the characteristics or quality of the goods, products,
services, features or qualities of the persons of the contracting
parties) becomes relevant.
In the preliminary phase of the negotiation, there are
normally asymmetries of information between the parties,
which are, moreover, reciprocal, on circumstances inherent to
the negotiation; they may concern the characteristics of the
parties (of their goods, their services: hidden information), or the
conduct of the parties themselves (hidden action).
A party may have more information2 than the other
party on circumstances concerning the contract; and a party
is presumed to have more information than the other party on
circumstances relating to relevant assumptions, elements and
essential features of the contract, which are within its sphere
of influence or under its control, in particular relating to their
characteristics (on its characteristics, its capacity, its qualities,
its ability to perform; the characteristics, qualities of its
performance, its goods, its property; the terms of the contract
prepared, etc.). This information is likely to influence the other
1 Various distinctions are made concerning information; in particular, it is
distinguished into technological information, about productive resources
or opportunities, information about personal data, and market information,
about market parameters (price, quality or other attributes of the goods
or parties, of the terms on which potential contractors intend to conclude
contracts) (Hirshleifer, 1973; Beales, Craswell and Salop, 1981; Mackaay,
1982).
2 There is asymmetry when one party has more information than the other,
and when it is easier to get information at a lower cost than the other.
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