Explaining Judicial Populism in Hungary - A Legal Realist Approach

AutorMátyás Bencze
CargoProfessor of law, University of Debrecen, research fellow, Centre for Social Science, Institute for Legal Studies
Páginas83-96
83
dossier
E J P  H –
 L R A
Explicar el populismo judicial en Hungría.
Una aproximación desde el el Realismo Social
M B
University of Debrecen and Centre for Social Sciences
Institute for Legal Studies, Hungary
Abstract
In Hungary, some judges tend to decide cases in a way they think is popular among ordinary
people. I call this phenomenon “judicial populism”. First, by analysing three cases I argue
that the plausible theoretical framework of explanation of populist tendencies in Hungarian
adjudication is the American Legal Realism. en I examine the characteristics and possible
explanation of judicial populism and its relation with the political populism.
Keywords
Judicial Populism, Judicial Formalism, eory of Adjudication, Political Populism, American
Legal Realism, Hungarian Judicial Practice.
Resumen
En Hungría, algunos jueces tienden a decidir los casos de una manera que consideran es popular
entre la gente común. Yo llamo a este fenómeno “populismo judicial”. En primer lugar, a través de
analizar tres casos, sostengo que el marco teórico plausible para explicar las tendencias populistas
en la jurisdicción húngara es el Realismo Legal estadounidense. En segundo término, examino las
características y la posible explicación del populismo judicial y su relación con el populismo político.
Palabras clave
Populismo judicial, Formalismo judicial, Teoría de la adjudicación, Populismo político,
Realismo jurídico estadounidense, Práctica judicial húngara.
1. Introduction
In Hungary, some judges tend to decide cases in a way they think is popular among ordinary
people. I call this phenomenon “judicial populism”.3 I argue in this paper that judicial populism
cannot be explained correctly —and cannot even be detected— by interpreting and evaluating
judgments with utmost good faith.
1 is publication is part of the DEMOS project and has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822590. Any dissemination of results here presented reects
only the authors’ view. e Agency is not responsible for any use that may be made of the information it contains. I am
grateful to my reviewers for their valuable comments.
2 Mátyás Bencze, professor of law, University of Debrecen, research fellow, Centre for Social Science, Institute for Legal
Studies. E-mail: bencze.matyas@tk.mta.hu ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3234-0440
3 Another group within the judiciary remains more loyal to the law, and sticks to the principles of established judicial
practice, even if that makes them unpopular to the point where they have to face heavy criticism or even threats from
politicians and journalists. But this is another story I will analyse in a dierent paper.
Recibido: 04/02/2020 – Aceptado: 06/05/2020
Iuris Dictio 25 / Junio 2020 / pp. 83-96
e-ISSN 2528-7834 / DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18272/iu.v25i25.1635

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