An exercise in legal realism
| Autor | Riccardo Guastini |
| Cargo | Professor of General Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law in several universities in Italy, France, and Spain |
| Páginas | 37-47 |
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Un ejercicio de realismo jurídico
R G
Tarello Institute for Legal Philosophy, Italy
Abstract
is paper is an exercise in legal realism, regarding in particular: (1) legal realism and legal
positivism; (2) validity; (3) legal interpretation; (4) the ontology of law; (5) legal cognition;
(6) the rule of recognition; (7) the concept of obligation.
Keywords
Legal Realism, Legal Positivism, Validity, Interpretation, Ontology of Law, Legal Cognition,
Rule of Recognition, Obligation.
Resumen
Este artículo, desde el punto de vista del realismo jurídico, versa sobre los temas siguientes:
(1) realismo y positivismo; (2) validez; (3) interpretación jurídica; (4) ontología del Derecho;
(5) conocimiento jurídico; (6) regla de reconocimiento; (7) el concepto de obligación.
Palabras clave
Realismo jurídico, Positivismo jurídico, Validez, Interpretación jurídica, Ontología del
derecho, Conocimiento jurídico, Regla de reconocimiento, Obligación.
1. Legal Positivism
I shall begin by discussing a mostly “domestic” issue2, related to Italian literature. Beyond its
domestic character, it gives me the opportunity to clarify some basic features of legal realism
(and legal positivism too).
In Italian legal-philosophical literature, legal realism is often distinguished from and
contrasted to legal positivism3. is view can be explained only by an odd and narrow concept
of legal positivism, identied more or less with the doctrines of XIX century continental legal
scholars —who were used to identify the law in force with the set of normative sentences
(especially: codes) enacted by the law-giving authorities, assumed such set of sentences
to be complete (gapless) and consistent, and moreover conceived legal interpretation and
adjudication as a merely cognitive enterprise (Bobbio, 1961, p. 2)—.
Nowadays, however, this picture is by and large considered as a misleading account
of legal positivism (Ross 1963; Bulygin 2007). Rather, legal positivism is generally regarded
1 Riccardo Guastini was professor of General Jurisprudence and Constitutional Law in several universities in Italy, France,
and Spain. He is coeditor of three journals:Analisi e diritto,Ragion pratica,Materiali per una storia della cultura giuridica.
Among his recent works:Le fonti del diritto (2010); Interpretare e argomentare (2011); Distinguendo ancora (2013); Discutendo
(2017); Filosoa del diritto positivo (2017). E-mail: guastini@unige.it ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2125-8196
2 Not only domestic, however: see Leiter (2007, pp. 59-).
3 See e.g. Bobbio (1961a, p. 141-); Pattaro (1971; Jori 1987). See also Barrère Unzueta (1990, ch. 3).
Recibido: 04/02/2020 – Aceptado: 06/05/2020
Iuris Dictio Nº 25 / Junio 2020 / pp. 37-47
e-ISSN 2528-7834 / DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.18272/iu.v25i25.1630
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