When conceptual autonomy leads to in the (autonomous) absence: Where is moral damage going? A revision of Italian case law
| Autor | Luca Oliveri |
| Cargo | University of Genoa |
| Páginas | 181-210 |
181
Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia RFJ No.10 Diciembre 2021
Oliveri, L. When conceptual autonomy leads to in the absence
When conceptual autonomy leads to in the
(autonomous) absence: Where is moral damage
going? A revision of Italian case law
Cuando la autonomía conceptual lleva a la inexistencia
(autónoma): ¿hacia dónde va el daño moral? un panorama
de la jurisprudencia italiana
Luca Oliveri
University of Genoa
City: Genoa
Country: Italy
Original article (research)
RFJ, No. 10, 2021, pp. 181-210, ISSN 2588-0837
ABSTRACT: The starting point of this brief itinerary within
the jurisprudence of legitimacy is constituted by the famous
sentences of San Martino, pronounced by the United Sections in
November 2008, a true and proper crucial moment concerning
the subject matter of attention. If this is the starting point, it is
not yet possible, on the other hand, to identify a real moment
of conclusion of this path, since the point of arrival, far from
being reached, looks more and more like a mirage. However,
within this ( secular ) litaniae sanctorum, one may sometimes
come across some statements that could be peacefully defined
as unexpected, if not surprising: small deviations, in short, from
the usual path of argumentation that struggle to fit into the latter
in a logically coherent way, generating not a little confusion in
the jurist.
KEYWORD: jurisprudence, theory of law, damages,
morality, justice
DOI 10.26807/rfj.v10i10.386
182
Revista Facultad de Jurisprudencia RFJ No.10 Diciembre 2021
Oliveri, L. When conceptual autonomy leads to in the absence
RESUMEN: El punto de partida de este breve itinerario
dentro de la jurisprudencia de la legitimidad está constituido
por las famosas sentencias de San Martino, pronunciadas por
las Secciones Unidas en noviembre de 2008, un verdadero y
propio momento crucial con respecto al tema que nos ocupa.
Si este es el punto de partida, todavía no es posible, por otra
parte, identificar un momento real de conclusión de este
camino, ya que el punto de llegada, lejos de ser alcanzado, se
parece cada vez más a un espejismo. Sin embargo, dentro de
estos litaniae sanctorum (seculares), uno puede encontrarse
a veces con algunas afirmaciones que podrían definirse
tranquilamente como inesperadas, cuando no sorprendentes:
pequeñas desviaciones, en definitiva, de la senda habitual de
la argumentación que pugnan por encajar en ésta de forma
lógicamente coherente, generando confusión en el jurista.
PALABRAS CLAVE: jurisprudencia, teoría del derecho, daños,
moral, justicia.
CODICE JEL: K41, K12.
INTRODUCTION
Carlo Francesco Gabba, back in 1911, reflecting on the
ontology (to use a term that is very common today in Italian legal
theory and jurisprudence on the subject) and, consequently,
on the compensability of moral damages, said that French and
Belgian jurisprudence - in favor of the compensability of this
type of prejudice - never defined the concepts relating to it and,
therefore, the indeterminacy of ideas that followed was the cause
of the continuous flooding of the doctrine of compensation for
non-asset damage (Gabba, 1911, pp. 219-220), “which today
is a spectacle in civil jurisprudence, especially Italian” (Gabba,
1911, pp. 219-220). The indefiniteness of ideas, according to the
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